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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LUDEAN I-I. COX,
Plaintiff and Appellant.

-vs.EDWARD C. CARLISLE, Mayor of
Manti City, MANTI CITY, A Municipal
Corporation, Henry Henningson, John
Mcintosh and Ed Nielson,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9242

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND· APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fences fell and the Manti City grader plowed its· way
across the neatly furrowed farmland. Manti City was opening up a platted street outside the Manti city limits, which
the Plaintiff and her predecessors had been farming for
several generations.
Immediately upon obtaining notice of the heavy equipment's invasion, Plaintiff filed suit to prevent the trespass
and obtain damages for the injury to the growing crops, the
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destroyep. leveled farm land and the engineered irrigation
system.
Trial was held on .l\'lay 28, 1959, in the District Court
in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah. The Court dismissed the Plaintiff-Appellant's action and declared that the
Defendant-Respondent Manti City was the owner of the 66
foot strip of land located between Plaintiff-Appellant's Parcels 99 and 113, Plat "A" Manti City Survey, and that said
strip of land was a· public road.
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Decree in
favor of .· the several Defendants-Respondents entered· and
filed on February 26, 1960, based upon the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
For convenience, the parties will be referred to as
they appeared in the Court below.
PLEADINGS
The Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff is the owner
of Parcel 99 and Parcel 113 and all land located between said
Parcels in Plat "A", Manti City Survey, Sanpete County,

Utah.
It further states that Defendants unlawfully without
Plaintiff's consent and against her repeated protests, entered
upon her farm, destroyed her fences, crushed and damaged
the crops planted thereon, and destroyed the leveled grade
and engineered irrigation system on said land.
The Plaintiff asked the Court for a restraining order
to prevent the Defendant Manti City from building a road
on the strip of land farmed by Plaintiff, for $1,000.00 special
damages and $5,000.00 general damages.

2
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The Defendant's answered Plaintiff's complaint by
claiming ownership of the strip of land between Parcels 99
and 113, in that the said strip of land was laid out and dedicated as a public street as shown on the official Plat of
Manti City.
EVIDENCE
The Defendant Manti City is an Incorporated City of
the third class in Sanpete County, Utah. The Plaintiff is
the owner of an 80 acre farm which includes Parcels 99 and
113 and the strip of land between them, said farm being
located north of the City limits. The official plat of Manti
City shows a 66 foot wide public road between the said
Parcels 99 and 113.
It was stipulated that taxes had not been paid on the
said 66 foot strip of land. It was Plaintiff's evidence that
the premises had always been part of Plaintiff and her predecessors farm.
Parcel 113 was deeded to William A. Cox on December 21, 1871, from Luther T. Tuttle, Mayor of Manti City.
Parcel 99 was deeded to William Bench on December 14,
1871, from Luther 'r. Tuttle, Mayor Manti City. Both of these
conveyances were made pursuant to the act of the Utah
Legislature of February 17, 1869, (Compiled Laws of 1869,
Sec. 1166 et seq.) and an act of Congress of March 2, 1867.
The Mayor of Manti received Title to all the land
(both Parcels 99 and 113 and the strip between) in trust
for the several use and benefit of the occupants of the said
City by a patent from the United States of America dated
September 2, 1872. This patent was issued pursuant to the

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

provisions of the Federal Townsite Act of 1867
March 2, 1867, 14th Stat. 541, 43 USCA, 718.)

(Act of

Manti City had been settled and occcupied as a Townsite for many years having been incorporated in 1851 under
the laws of the Territory of Utah.
On January 25, 1892, the official Plat of Manti City
prepared in February of 1871, was adopted. It showed that
Parcels 99 and 113, Plat "A" Manti City Survey, were separated by a road 66 feet wide and 759 feet long.
The Defendants-Respondents rely upon the official
plat to prove their title to the said strip of land. They also
introduced testimony from three witnesses to prove that the
public once used this road. Plaintiff-Appellant believes that
the witnesses testimony does not show there was ever a road
on the land in question.
The Plaintiff-Appellant introduced testimony showing
that for over 70 years there has never been a road on the
said land and that the land was always used as part of the
farm of Plaintiff and her predecessors in interest.
The Plaintiff also introduced in evidence to prove
there never was a road in existence, Civil Case No. 786, in
the District Court in and for Sanpete County, Utah, which
case resulted in a Decree disconnecting and detaching this
and other property from the city limits of Manti. This case
was commenced in 1910 by a Petition signed by 43 owners
of real property located immediately north of the City which
included the owners of Parcels 99 and 113. All of these
landowners and citizens of Manti stated there were no streets,
alleys, sidewalks, or any public improvements on any of said
premises to be detached and disconnected from the City. The

4
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effect of these ancient documents is to show that there was
no road between Parcels 99 and 113. It is also interesting
to note that the map of the area to be disconnected makes a
jag to take in this specific property, namely Parcels 99 and
113 and the strip of land located between the said parcels.
To prove there once was a road, the Defendants-Respondents called the following witnesses:
First: William T. Hall, an 80 year old resident of Manti
who died soon after this testimony, stated that he could
remember when the land in question as well as land located
further north was not separated by fences and that there
were bars to get into the premises. He stated that all of
the land was used as a community cow range. He testified
that there was a public road over the premises, but on Crossexamination on page 39 he stated:
"Question:

(By Mr. Tibbs) So that, in other word,
there wasn't any definite markings of a
road. It was merely a couple of gates
through the field?

Answer: Well, that is right.

That is right.

MR. TIBBS: That is all.
THE WITNESS: There were just bars.
MR. WOOLLEY: That is all then."
Second: Defendants-Respondents also relied on the
testimony of Fred W. Cox who testified there once was a
road between the two Parcels. He is the same Fred W. Cox
who signed the Petition in Civil Case No. 786 in 1910 as previously referred to, which stated in effect that there was no
road over the premises.

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On page 107 on Direct-examination, he testified where
the road went through the premises.
"Question: (By Mr. Woolley) State whether or not
there was any bars in that fence?
Answer: There was bars down by Uncle Haze Clark's
Stack yard.
Question: Were there any bars in that fence near the
cemetery corner: that far south?
Answer: No. Not that I ever remember.
Question: You don't remember those?
Answer: No. We came down to the bottom of Parcel
99 and then went right out through these bars.
Question: What bars are you talking about?
Answer Well, the bars ove-r next to the cemetery
line here to where Uncle Haze Clark's stack
yard was. We came right out on the south side
of his stack yard and come in to the lane across
from over to the bottom of Parcel 99."
Consequently, the road he described, if any, was not
on the strip of land between parcel 99 and 113, but located
on the land farther to the north. It is worth noting in regards
to this testimony that the "Uncle Haze Clark" referred to,
is the same person as H. R. Clark, the witness for the Plaintiff, who testified there has never been a road over the strip
of land between Parcels 99 and 113.
Third: The Defendant Manti City also relied on William Ambrose Tuttle to prove there was a public road.
He testified on page 126 about the gates being located
on the Clark premises.

6
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''Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) You mentioned getting out
of the gates down by Mr. Clark's premises,
didn't you?
Answer:

There was bars. There was not gates.

Question: The bars?
Answer:

That is right.

Question: That was on the east fence?
Answer:

That is right. That runs north.

MR. TIBBS: I call the court's attention to the fact that the Clark premises are not the premises
known as 113 or 99. They are premises further to the north.
THE COURT: That is my impression.
THE WITNESS:. Well, I am not acquainted, of course
Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) Just one other question,
Ambrose, excuse me. But I know you well, too.
You have gone through ditches and over lanes,
through all of the dogon farm land around here,
haven't you·
Answer:

Yes, sir."

On page 125 Mr. Tuttle also testified that he never
saw anyone go over the strip of land between Parcels 99
and 113.
"Question:

(By Mr. Tibbs) How old were you then?

Answer: I was about six years old. I would say
about '96 when it was. As I have stated, I am
seventy-three, will be on the first day of August.
Question: Did you ever see anybody
through there?
Answer:

else

No, sir. I never did.
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travel

Question: Drive cattle through?
Answer: No. I don't know anybody ever drove cattle
through. As I say, I am not acquainted and not
prepared to argue or make any statements on
that."
The Plaintiff-Appellant to prove there was never a
road located between Parcels 99 and 113 called Dr. H. R.
Clark, a lifetime resident of Manti, whose family owned the
premises immediately to the north of Parcel 113 and who
has been familiar with Parcel 99 and 113 for over 70 years.
He testified on page 77 as follows:
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) So you can nearly remember back seventy years, is that correct?
Answer: Yes, sir. I herded cows up and down that
lane all my young life.
Question: Now that lane is the lane between the Cox
farm - Answer:

And the cemetery.

Question: The cemetery. Dr. Clark, during this time
do you ever remember of a public road traveling
from the cemetery lane, if you want to call it
that, west across the Grant Cox farm?
Answer:

No, sir. There never 'was a road there.

Question: Do you ever remember the public traversing that, those - Answer:

No, sir. They never did.

Question: - - lands? Did you ever remember a road
being fenced over those lands·
Answer:

No, I don't.

Question: During this time has, have those lands been
used for farming purposes?

8
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Answer:

Always. As near as I know.

Question: Have they always been occupied by farmers?
Answer:

Yes, sir.

Question: Has there ever been strips running east and
west that weren't farmed or weren't occupied
by the farmers that were occupying the land"?
Answer:

No, sir."

The Plaintiff's family owned the Parcels in question
and on page 59 she testified concerning her knowledge of
the premises.
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) Have you been familiar
with this land for the past forty years then?
Answer:

I think I could say that I have been.

Question: During that time, Mrs. Cox, has there ever
been a road over that land?
Answer:

Not to my recollection.

Question: Have you ever seen the public cross that
land at any place going from east to west?
Answer: Not that I remember of. As I remember it,
our ten acres joined right on the land owned by
Mr. Henry that was right to the bottom of our
farm, of our top ten acres, and there was willows, and, of course, the fence, and then there
was willows and shrubs along the bottom. Not
shrubs, but willows, rose bushes, things of that
nature, that was along the bottom of the fence.
Question: Did you subsequently come into possession
of the property that you designate owned by
Mr. Henry?
Answer:

Yes. My father bought it from Mr. Henry."

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On page 92 Grant Cox, the husband of the Plaintiff,
testified concerning his knowledge that there was not a
road over the premises.
"Question: (By Mr. Tibbs) Since you've been familiar
with this land and since you have owned this
land has there, has anyone ever had possession
of a strip of land across, crossing this farm other
than the occupant of the premises, Parcel 99,
Parcel 113?
Answer:
Nobody has ever had access to that land
except us."

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The main question involved is whether or not Manti
City should be prevented from building a road over a platted
street outside the City limits, which land has been used and
improved as part of the Plaintiff's farming operation.
In the Trial Court the Plaintiff argued two points:
1. That under the Federal Townsite acts of March 2,
1867, the Mayor of Manti was given title to the land,
in Trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants
thereof, according to their respective interests. The Plaintiff
relies on the Deed from the Mayor of Manti City dated
December 14, 1871, recorded May 12, 1874, as to Parcel 99,
and on the Deed dated December 21, 1871, recorded January
10, 1872, as to Parcel 113. Plaintiff contends that because
these Deeds are dated prior to the time the Mayor of Manti
received the premises in trust, it shows that the premises.
both Parcels 99 and 113, and the strip between them, were
occupied prior to the time the Mayor received the patent.
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2. That in the event the Court did not hold that the
strip of land located between Parcel 99 and Parcel 113 was
held in trust for the Plaintiff or her predecessors who were
occupiers of said land then the Plaintiff contends the City
is estopped to open up the road because of the exceptional
circumstances involved and because equity and justice requires that the municipality be precluded from causing
irrepairable injury to this plaintiff who honestly and in good
faith and acting because of the City's conduct made the valuable improvements to the entire 80 acre farm by leveling
and placing an engineered irrigation system on same.
SPECIFICATION OF POINTS RELIED UPON
FO·R A REVERSAL OF THE
JUDGMENT APPEALED FRO·M
The errors upon which the Appellant relies for the
reversal of the Judgment appealed from are:
POINT I
BECAUSE OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN FAILING TO USE THE DOCTRINE OF ESTO·PPEL TO PREVENT THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MANTI CITY
FROM O·PENING THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND
USED AS PART OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S FARM
AS A PUBLIC STREET.
p·oiNT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 8, WHERE IT FOUND· THAT
THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND BETWEEN PARCELS 99 AND 113, PLAT "A" lVIANTI CITY SURVEY,
HAD BEEN USED AS A PUBLIC STREET.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 9, WHERE IT FOUND THAT
THE PLAINTIFF OR HER PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST
WERE NOT IN OCCUPANCY OF THE SAID 66 FOOT
WIDE STRIP OF LAND AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY
UPON THE LAND· BY THE CORPORATE AUTHORITIES
OF MANTI CITY.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 10, WHEN IT HELD THERE
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE 66 FOOT WIDE STRIP WAS OCCUPIED
BY ANY PRIVATE PERSON AT ANY TIME· PRIOR TO
THE DATE OF THE PATENT TO LUTHER T. TUTTLE,
MAYOR OF MANTI, AND THAT IF THE 66 FOOT WIDE
STRIP WAS NOT BEING USED AS A PUBLIC STREET
AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY, IT WAS VACANT AND
UNOCCUPIED, AND ON JANUARY 25, 1892, WAS DEDICATED AS A PUBLIC STREET.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 12, WHEN IT FOUND THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF LEGAL ABANDONMENT OR
ANY AB.ANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC STREET BY
MANTI CITY OR BY OFFICIAL CITY OR CO·UNTY ACT'IO·N.
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ARGUMENT
This is an action in equity and In law. It is either
admitted in the pleadings or is stipulated by the parties that
Manti City is a Municipal Corporation, that the Plaintiff
Ludean H. Cox is the owner and is in possession of Parcel
99 and Parcel 113, Plat "A" of Manti City Survey. Plat "A"
of Manti City Survey shows a strip of land between Parcels
99 and 113 held in the name of Luther Tuttle, Mayor of
Manti City in trust for the several use and benefit of the
occupants of the City according to their respective interests.
It is the Defendants' contention that the· strip of land is a
road and that they have possession of it. It is Plaintiff's
contention that they and their predecessors in interest have
always had the possession of the strip of land between Parcels
99 and 113, and that said strip of land has always been used
as a part of the farming operation of Plaintiff and her predecessors. Plaintiff further contends that the City has never
had possession of said strip of land, that there has never
been a road located on it.
Plain tiff's testimony is to the effect that for over 40
years she has been familiar with the property, and during
this time there has never been a public road across the
premises.
Dr. H. R. Clark, a life long resident of Manti, testified
that his father owned the land immediately north of Parcel
113. He testified he could remember for over seventy years,
and that based upon his memory and familiarity with these
premises he knew there had never been a public road across
them, and that the strip of land, if there was one, had always
been used by the occupants of the land as part of their farm.
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Grant Cox, husband of the Plaintiff testified that he had
been farming the premises since approximately 1933, and
knew that since that time there has never been a road across
the land.
The Court admitted in evidence Civil Case No. 786
in the District Court in and for Sanpete County, wherein a
Petition was filed by Fred Jensen and others -vs- Manti
City, praying for the detachment from the City limits of certain territory, including Parcel 99 and Parcel 113, and the
strip of land located between them. This Petition was signed
by over 3/.iths of the farmers owning land immediately north
of Manti City, including plaintiffs predecessors in interest.
The Petitioners on March 4, 1910, stated that they were the
owners of the land immediately to the East and North of the
boundaries of Manti City, that the land was used for agricultural purposes, that the land was located outside the City
as indicated by streets and roads, and they stated that the
land was situated out of and remote from the range of Municipal benefits, there being no streets, alleys, or sidewalks,
or any other improvements thereon. They also stated that
the land had not been utilized or needed for Municipal purposes, and it was entirely unlikely and improbable that the
City would ever be extended to, or upon said land, or that
any streets, driveways, or other improvements would ever be
had or made.
In response to the Petition an Order was served upon
Manti City in the same manner as a Summons. A Publication of Notice was published in the Manti Messenger for ten
days, and the Default of Manti City was entered on April
4, 1910. The Court appointed three Commissioners to adjust
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the terms of the property to be severed, and to determine
the mutual property rights of the City to the territory to be
detached. The Commissioners reported there was no property
belonging to said City, or in which the City had any interest,
located or situated on or upon the said described territory,
or any part thereof. This covered Parcels 99 and 113 and the
66 foot strip of land now claimed by Manti City. The Court
on May 20, 1910, by A. J. Christensen, Judge, issued an Order
in pur~uance to the Commissioners' report and prayer, and
it was ordered that the territory be disconnected and segre-.
gated from Manti City.
In comparison with the Plaintiff's evidence the Defendants presented the testimony of three witnesses, namely,
William Terry Hall, F. W. Cox, and Ambrose Tuttle.
In analyzing the testimony in the best light favorable
to the Defendants, Mr. Hall testified that he had travelled
across this land, and that there was a bar-gate on the West
end of the William Bench land, and a bar-gate on the Haze
Clark land, which incidently, Haze Clark is the same as Dr.
H. R. Clark that testified there had never been a road on the
premises. Mr. Hall stated that there was a road running West
from 1st East to the Cannery, that if they wanted to go
through they lifted the bars down and traveled across the
land. He knew there was a road because when he was a kid
he and his father hauled hay across it. He stated other people used it, but he couldn't say who. He also stated that he
went over it to avoid going into Manti City and around to
5th North and back. He stated that Brother Clark, Mr.
Bench, Old Mr. Barton and Shomaker never objected. He
stated that he and his father always respected the rights of
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the land owners.

Mr. Fred W. Cox testified that he farmed with his
father William Arthur Cox ln 1905 or 1906 to 1911. He
claimed that he had crossed this land on numerous occasions,
and then stated that the bars of the gates were on the land
of "Uncle Haze Clark". Viewing his testimony in the best
light, it appears that he had gone across part of the premises,
but that the gate was not on the strip of land between Parcel
99 and Parcel 113, but was farther North on the Clark property, North of Parcel113.
The last witness relied upon by Defendants was Ambrose Tuttle. He testified that on two different occasions
he took equipment on the land known as the Cox premises.
That there was a road on the farm land, and in order to get
to it from the West he had to cover a deep ditch using 2
by 4's. He testified he did not .know if it was a public road.
He also testified that he had gone over most of the roads and
lanes in Sanpete County and on many individual's farms.
In reviewing the testimony of all three witnesses, none
testified there was a fenced road separating Parcel 99 and
Parcel 113. The witnesses Hall and Cox testified that the
bar gate on the East of the road was farther North than
Parcel 113, and consequently they did not have the alleged
road located where D·efendant Manti City now claims a
road to be.
The Trial Court placed the burden of proof on the
Plaintiff to show an occupancy of the 66 foot strip of land
between the parcels prior to the date of the Patent. It is
the contention of the Plaintiff that the burden should have
been on the Defendant to show that there was a dedicated
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road between the parcels. Plaintiff contends that before the
Mayor of Manti City received the Patent from the United
States Government there were occupants of the premises
known as Parcel 99 and 113, and consequently the premises
located between the Parcels. Because of the great length
of time that has elapsed since 1871, it is impossible for anyone to obtain witnesses to testify to the occupancy of the
land before that time. However, Plaintiff has evidence back
70 years or as long as memory of man and that evidence is
to the effect there has never been a road over this 66 foot
strip of land~

The Court should also apply the Doctrine of Equitable
Estopple as was done by our Supreme Court in Wall -vsSalt Lake City, (50 Utah 592, 168 Pacific 766) in view of the
exceptional circumstances involved. The Trial Court distinguished Wall -vs- Salt Lake City from the present case because Plaintiff had failed to show an affirmative act on the
part of the City as a basis for the Plaintiff's and her predecessors' actions in occupying the said land. The Plaintiff
contends that the Doctrine of Equitable Estopple cannot be
subjected to fixed and settled rules of universal application,
like legal estoppels, or hampered by the narrow confines of
a technical formula. (19 Am. J ur. 642) The Plaintiff further
contends that there was such in-action on the part of the
City under this exceptional state of facts and under the Civil
Case detaching this property from the City limits to warrant
Plaintiff's improving the land and the Court to apply the
Doctrine of Eq ui table Estopple.
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POINT I
BECAUSE O·F THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES INVO·LVED THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO USE THE DO·CTRINE OF ESTOPPLE TO· PREVENT THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT MANTI CITY
FROM O·PENING THE 66 .FOOT WIDE STRIP OF LAND
USED AS PART OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S LAND
AS A PUBLIC ROAD.
Although there is some authority to the contrary, it
has been more generally held and recognized that under
some exceptional circumstances a Municipality may be estopped to open or use a street or alley heretofore created
and still existing in point of law, but never opened, or once
opened and in use, since fallen into disuse and seemingly
abandoned, and it seems fair to say that the weight of authority sustains the possibility of a Municipality being estopped in this respect. (See 171 ALR Page 98, Wall -vs- Salt
Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 Pacific 766).
The Oregon Court in Dabney -vs- Portland, (124 Oregon 54, 263 Pacific 386) held:
"No hard and fixed rule can be stated for determining when this principle (Estoppel in pais against a municipality) should be applied. Each case
must be considered in the light of its own particular
facts and circumstances."
In 171 ALR 107 it states:
"Among the cases, there appears to be rather
general agreement that an equitable estoppel precluding a municipality from opening or using a public
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street will arise only under exceptional circumstances
strongly calling for the application of that doctrine
to prevent manifest injustice."
It goes on further to say:
"One basic requirement for the existence of
such an estoppel against a municipality is that the
conduct of the municipality and the situation of the
one in possession of the street or alley area must, as
a whole, be such that it would be clearly inequitable to allow the municipality to open the street and
destroy and remove the private improvements."
Plaintiff believes that this is a case where justice
should require the Defendant-Respondent be estopped from
opening the alleged road. There is no evidence that there
was ever a fenced or an improved street or any houses or
buildings located near it. The testimony of the nearest neighbor, who has been familiar with the property his entire life
(over seventy years) was that there has never been a road
or a street where Defendant contends it is located and that
the strip of land has never been used by the public
The evidence is to the effect that as long as man can
remember the strip of land between the Parcels has been
used as part of the Plaintiff and her predecessors' farm.
There is also so the ancient case, Civil Case No. 786, filed
in the District Court in and for Sanpete County, namely
Fred Jensen and others -vs- Manti City, for the detachment
of land North of Manti from the City limits. This action was
commenced by a Petition signed by more than 3/t!ths of the
farmers owning land in the vicinity. This Petition in 1910
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stated that the land was situated out of and remote from the
range of municipal benefits, there being no streets, alleys, or
sidewalks or any other public improvements therein. The
Court adopted the report of the

Commissioners, wherein

they reported there was no property belonging to said City
or in which the City had any interest.
Over 30 years elapsed after the Court's Decree
and the Plaintiff went to great expense in making improvements on the premises in accordance with good farming procedures. The entire 80 acre farm of the Plaintiff was
leveled and an engineered cement irrigation system was installed at a cost in excess of $15,000.00, in order that the
utmost benefit could be derived from the irrigation water
available for the said farm. The leveling and irrigation system greatly inhanced the value of the farm. When the
Defendant-Respondent made its swath through the farm with
the grader, it destroyed the grade for the irrigation system
and the entire 80 acre farming operation of Plaintiff was
substantially damaged. Plaintiff contends that when the
Municipality failed to contest the allegations in the Detachment Proceedings, Civil Case No. 786, its negative conduct
was even stronger than the affirmative conduct of the City
in the case of Wall -vs- Salt Lake City, and that such negative conduct was of a type which would mislead and induce
the Plaintiff to place the improvements on this farm and consequently on this strip of land under a claim of right and
in good faith. Plaintiff-Appellant contends that these facts
present a strong basis for an estoppel precluding the Municipality from opening up this strip of land as a road.
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In Boise City -vs- Wilkinson (16 Idaho 150, 102 Pacific
148) the Court applied the Doctrine of Estoppel:
"We recognize that, as a general rule, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to municipal corporations, and we are not unmindful of the fact that the
courts of many states have absolutely refused to
apply it to such corporations. We are not prepared,
however, to announce an unalterable and unexceptionable rule in this state, which would inevitably result in perpetrating wrong and injustice in exceptional cases like this. Courts of equity are established for
the administration of justice in those peculiar cases
where substantial justice cannot be administered under the express rules of law, and to adopt a rigid rule
that recognizes no exception would be to rob such
courts of much of their efficacy and power for administering even-handed justice. The people in their
collective and soverign capacity ought to observe the
same rules and standard of honesty and fair dealing
that is expected of a private citizen. In their collective and governmental capacity they should no more
be allowed to 1ull the citizen to repose and confidence
in what would otherwise be a false and erroneous
position than should the private citizen."
In our case we are not concerned with a street where
there are houses and barns located next thereto, but with
a strip of land outside of the City limits which has been ~sed
and improved as part of an irrigated farm.
In Wall -vs- Salt Lake City, (50 Utah 593, 168 Pacific

766) this Court held that:
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"Whether or not the ground in dispute was a
platted street at the time the town site was entered,
and whether or not it was platted at that time and
recognized by persons conveying adjacent property,
and whether or not occupants of the land, in presenting their claims to the probate court, by not
claiming certain ground platted as streets, thereby
abandoned any right they may have had or became
barred by the statute of limitations, and whether or
not the federal grant under which the town site was
entered should be construed one way or the other,
are questions which are not in the least degree controlling in view of the conclusion at which we have
arrived."
The Court then went on to say that the question is:
"Whether or not the Defendant City is estopped by reason of its own conduct from now claiming title to the property in question."
The Court held that the Defendant by its acts, conducts and representations was estopped in setting up any
claim whatsoever to said property, or any part thereof, for
any purpose whatsoever. The Court held that a Municipal
Corporation can no more profit by fraud upon property
owners than an individual, and may be estopped by its
conduct.
In Wall -vs- Salt Lake City, 21 years had elapsed
from the first adoption of the Plat of Freemont Heights before the Defendant suddenly entered upon the premises and
commenced work which finally culminated in the commencement of the action. Our Supreme Court held rightly that
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it was its duty to decide as right and justice required. In
our present case over 40 years have elapsed since anyone
other than the owners went over the premises, and examining
all the evidence together, it is very doubtful if anyone other
than the Surveyor intended a road to go over this strip of
land, and certainly there has been no road over the premises
as long as man can remember.

In Washington -vs- Walla Walla (3 Washington 68,
13 Pacific 408) the Court stated:

"On the entry of lands, the interest .of the
public attached to those streets and alleys which
exist as a fact at the time of the entry, either by
actual use or by consent and acquiesence of the
occupants affected, and not streets or lots laid out
upon paper to which the occupant has never given
his consent."
In examining the cases, it is true that they exhibit
considerable differences in theory and in application of theory. This Plaintiff believes that each case must be considered based upon its own facts. In this case, Manti City's failure to con test the partition action and to show there were
allegedly streets within the area partitioned is such inaction
as to wrongfully mislead the Plaintiff into believing that she
could make the improvements on the land. Of course, it is
the Plaintiff's contention that the City did not take any
action because there never was a street and there was never
an intent to have a street at this location.
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In 171 ALR 110 it also states:
According to one substantial line of authority,
an estoppel to open or use a street may arise where
there is long-continued non-user by the Municipality, together with possession of the street area by
private parties acting in good faith and in the belief
that its use or once intended use as a street had
been abandoned, and their erection of valuable improvements thereon without objection from the Municapility, which has knowledge thereof and the situation is such that to permit the Municipality to
reclaim the land would result in great damage to
those in possession.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 8, WHERE IT FOUND THAT
THE 66 FO~OT WIDE STRIP OF LAND BETWEEN PARCELS 99 AND 113, PLAT "A" MANTI CITY SURVEY,
HAD BEEN USED AS A PUBLIC STREET.
There is no evidence that there has ever been a fenced
road on this strip of land and the testimony upon which the
Court based this finding did not even have the alleged road
on the strip of land involved. According to the testimony of
the Defendants-Respondent's witnesses, the only traveling
on the alleged road was when there were bar gates to get
in the large cow pasture. The East bar gate was not located
between the Parcels 99 and 113 which are on each side of
the strip of land in question. Contrary to the Court's findings, Dr. H. R. Clark of Manti, who has been familiar with

24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

this land for over 70 years testified that there has never
been a road over the premises. It is the Plaintiff's contention, consequently, that the Trial Court erred in making its
finding that this strip of land had been used as a public
street. Also the Plaintiff once again calls the Court's attention to the 43 signers of the Petition in the District Court
of Sanpete County, Civil Case No. 786, who stated there had
never been a road across said premises and there was not
a road across the premises in 1910.
POINT III
THE TRIAL CO·URT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS O·F FACT NUMBER 9, WHERE IT FOUND THAT
THE PLAINTIFF OR HER PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST
WERE NOT IN OCCUPANCY OF THE SAID 66 FOO·T
STRIP O·F LAND AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY UPON
THE LAND BY THE' CORPORATE AUTHORITIES OF
MANTI CITY.
This finding is not based on any evidence in this
record. The Terri to rial Townsite Act recognized the necessity of having streets and authorized the proper authorities
to designate such grounds as were at the time of the entry
in the land office being so used for public use and to hold
title thereof for such public use absolutely, but the acts did
not authorize the Corporate authorities to designate for
public use lands which at the time of the entry were being
occupied for private purposes, and thereafter hold the title
thereto absolute and without consent of the occupant. Plaintiff contends that because the Deeds from the Mayor of
Manti City, dated December 14, 1871, recorded March 12,
1874 on Parcel 99, and Deed dated December 21, 1871, re-
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corded January 10, 1872, as to Parcel 113, is prior to the
date of the patent is evidence to the effect that the farm
lands involved including the strip between them were occupied prior to the patent. The mere fact that the Plaintiff's
predecessor had not been adjudged to be the owner of the
strip of land was not an adjudication of said strip of land
between the Parcels in the event there was not a public
road on it at that time and Plaintiff contends the Mayor is
still holding title to said strip of land in trust for the occupants of said land.
It is Plaintiff's contention that the Trial Court in making this finding, put the burden of showing who was in
occupany of the 66 foot strip of land on the Plaintiff, when
in truth and in fact the burden should have been on the
Defendant to show a dedication of the street.
Plaintiff does not feel that this Supreme Court should
hold in the case of Hall -vs- North Ogden City that the city
was holding the property in trust for the occupants of the
land and then distinguish the Hall case from the present
situation because the memory of man does not go back far
enough. There is no question but that this land (alleged
road) has been occupied as part of the farm of plaintiff for
in excess of 70 years.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 10, WHEN IT HELD THERE
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE: 66 FOOT STRIP WAS_ OCCUPIED. BY
ANY PRIVATE PERSON AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE
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DATE OF THE PATENT TO LUTHER T. TUTTLE, MAYOR OF MANTI CITY, AND THAT IF THE 66 FOOT STRIP
WAS NOT BEING USED AS A PUBLIC STRE'ET AT THE
TIME OF THE ENTRY, IT WAS VACANT AND UNOCCUPIED, AND· ON JANUARY 25, 1892, WAS DEDICATED
AS A PUBLIC STREET.
The Court held in Hall et al -vs- North Ogden City
et al, that there must be a dedication to have a public street.
On page 341 the Court said:
"Before a dedication of a street to the public
use can be effected, there must be an intention to so
dedicate such lands on the part of the owner thereof
or he must act in such manner as to be estopped
from denying such intention. Such intention may be
shown either by oral or written declarations or it
may be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case but in all cases such intention
must be clearly manifested."
The Trial Court held in the present case tha~ if the
66 foot strip of land was not being used as a public street
at the time of the entry, it was vacant and unoccupied. This
in spite of the fact that the lands on both sides of it was
being farmed. Dr. Clark's memory goes back to 1892 and
he says there was no road on the premises at that time.
It also was held by the Court in Hall et al -vs- North
Ogden City et al on page 341 that the filing of the Plat did
not prove an intention on the part of the owners to dedicate
streets platted therein to public use, in absence of a showing
that the owners had anything to do with the preparing or
filing of the Plat.
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The Court further held in Hall -vs- Salt Lake City:
"The mere conveyance by the owner of a tract
of land describing it by reference to a map or plat
thereof without the other elements above mentioned
neither shows an intention to dedicate the streets
therein platted nor estops the owner from dtnying
such intention."

.In our case there is no evidence of any oral or written
declarations of any occupant at any time. The dedication
must be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances and according to Hall et al -vs- North Ogden City
et al, the intention must be clearly manifested. There is no
evidence that the owners had anything to do with preparing
or filing the Plat, so the mere filing of the Plat does not
prove any intention to dedicate and the mere fact that the
conveyances were made with references to the Plat does
not show an intention to dedicate or estop the occupants
from denying such intention.

POINTV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 12, WHEN IT FOUND THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF LEGAL ABANDONMENT OR
ANY ABANDONMENT OF THE PUBLIC STREET BY
MANTI CITY OR BY OFFICIAL CITY OR COUNTY
ACTION.
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There is no evidence of there ever having been a
public street on the said strip of land and if there has
never been a public street, there never could be an abandonment.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff-Appellant LuDean H. Cox, submits that
the decision of the Court based upon its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law is in error. The questions before
this Court are:
First: Are the particular facts and circumstances in
this case such that it would be clearly inequitable to allow
the Municipality to open the street and destroy the improvements; and
Second: Where the great preponderence of the evidence is to the effect there has never been a road across
the strip of land, will the mere fact that it is platted road
be sufficient to warrant the Municipality to open up this
land for a road outside the City limits when it has been
used as part of a farm in excess of 70 years?
The Judgment should be reversed and this Court
should hold that there is not one rule of morals for a M unicipality and another for an individual, that the Doctrine of
Equitable Estoppel should not be subject to fixed and settled
rules of universal application hampered by the narrow confines of a technical formula, and that instead each case
should be considered in the light of its own particular facts
and circumstances.
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The Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that this
case and cause be remanded to the Court below with instructions that the Court prevent the City from entering
the premises and the Court fix the damages caused to the
Plaintiff based upon the evidence submitted.
Respectfully submitted,

Don V. Tibbs,
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Manti, Utah.
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